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The new protectionism is also distinguished
by its heavyand increasing reliance on such
non-traditional barriers as "voluntaryexport
restraints" (VER) and "orderly marketing
arrangements." These generally amount to
quotas on imports ofagiveri'product from
one or more particular countries. For
example, the U.s. VER on autos applies to
Japan only. The discriminatory application
ofthese measures, and their implementation
outside the multilateral framework ofGATT,
represent a significant departure from such
traditional barriers to trade as tariffs.
The cost ofthis increased protectionism has
probably been very substantial. For
example, a study recently prepared by
Wharton Econometrics suggests that our
quotasonJapanese auto imports have raised
the average price ofa car sold ,in the U.S. by
nearly one thousand dollars. With roughly
seven million cars sold in the U.s. last year,
that added up to a total cost to U.S. consu-
mers ofnearly $7 billion from this measure
alone. Thus, whatever protection trade
barriers afford, itdoes not come cheaply.
New also is the geographic source from
which the new protectionism is emanating.
Manyofthe new barriers have been im-
posed by the U.S. and European nations to
combat imports from Japan and the newly
industrialized countries (NICs) ofAsia and
Latin America. These moves have come as
Japan and the NICs have gradually reduced
their own barriers to imports-often at the
urging ofthe U.s. and Europe, traditional
defenders of free-trade principles.
Reasons?
Protectionist measures have been engaged
for a variety ofreasons. Directed at Japan,
they are often justified as a necessary res-
ponse to that country's allegedly greater
protectionism compared to other major
industrial nations. Whilethis may have been
true some years ago, studies have shown
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In 1979, the last majormultilaterial
agreement loweringbarriers to international
trade was signed in Tokyo, culminating a
thirty-year effort underthe aegis ofthe
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to promote freer trade among the
world's nations. Now, scarcely five years
later, multiplyingprotectionist pressures and
actions pose perhaps the greatest post-war
threat to the continued growth of interna-
tional trade. Indeed, in the last eighteen
months, the U.S. government, normally a
leadingadvocateoffree trade, has restricted
imports ofmotorcycles and specialty steel,
while extending previously existing barriers
to textile and auto imports. Europe has
moved to restrict its imports of autos and
electronic equipment from Japan, and
threatens to retaliate against ourbarriers to
specialty steel by restricting its own imports
ofchemicals from the U.s. The situation
could get worse as, for example, "domestic
content" legislation that could effectively
curtail most U.S. auto imports is widely
favored in the U.S. Congress.
These developments have been dubbed the
"new protectionism," although in its
imposition oftrade barriers to alleviate
domestic problems itcan hardly be called
unprecedented. This Letter examineswhat is
really novel about the new protectionism
and the problems it may pose for the U.s.
and the world economy.
Scope
Certainly, the new protectionism represents,
asignificant increase in barriers to trade. The
International Monetary Fund's staff has
estimated that protectionist measures
adopted by the world's nations in the last
four years encompass products representing
nearly 20percentofworld trade in manufac-
tured goods and 33 percent ofagricultural
trade. Nearly50 percentofall world trade is
nowestimated to be affected tosome degree
bytrade barriers otherthan tariffs, compared
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thatJapan is now no more restrictive overall
toward imports than other major industrial
nations, including the U.s. Indeed, Japan's
average level oftariffs (5,9 percent) is cur-
rently lowerthan that ofEurope and only
slightly above that ofthe U.s, Admittedly,
Japan is relatively restrictive ofcertain pro-
ducts, such as agricultural goods. However,
the United States itselfseverely restricts
imports ofcertain agricultural products,
such as sugar and dairy products, while
European barriers to agricultural imports
(not to mention their subsidies ofagricul-
tural exports) generally are more stringent
than those ofeither the U.S. orjapan.
Likewise, protectionistmeasures bythe U.S.
havesometimes been advocated as awayto
reduce our large and growingtrade deficit,
itself sometimes blamed on protectionism
abroad. Butwhile barriers to imports reduce
the volume ofgoods we buy from abroad,
they may not improve ourtrade balance
significantly. Importprices could well rise
(as happened with our restrictions on Japan-
ese autos) and leave the value of imports
little changed. Furthermore, foreigners may
reduce their purchases ofourexports in
response to our restrictions on imports of
their goods. In any case, numerous studies
indicatethat itis the high valueofthe dollar,
not barriers to ourexports, that is largely
responsible for our trade deficit.
A more basic source ofprotectionist pres-
sure lies in the high unemployment in the
United States and Emope in such historically
key industries as autos and steel. Protec-
tionist measures have aimed in large part at
stemming the decline ofthese industries by
givingthem some relieffrom foreign compe-
tition. In part, these industries' woes reflect
the worldwide recession of 1980- 1982.
However, many ofthese sectors probably
are facing seculardeclinesthatreflect in part
a general shift in the output ofdeveloped
countries from heavy industry toward ser-
vices and higher technology manufactures.
More important are the relatively high wage
rates in the U.S. and Europe that putthem at
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a competitive disadvantage in steel, autos,
and other traditional industries against
lowerwage countries such as Japan and the
NICs. Such shifts in comparative advantage
are, ofcourse, neither new nor confined to
the West. Indeed, japan finds itself increas-
'ingly challenged in steel and shipbuilding
by Kore'il, Taiwan and other NICs.
New concepts
In the end, the most novel but problematic
aspect ofthe new protectionism may prove
to be the approaches to trade policy it has
advanced. In particular, the notions of
"bilateral reciprocity" and "industrial
policy" are increasingly advocated as bases
for trade negotiations even though they
represent significant departures from the
principlesthat underlietrade policyformost
ofthe post-war era.
Bilateral reciprocity. Bilateral reciprocity
entails restricting imports from a given
country to the same degree that that country
restricts one's exports to it. Thus, ifjapan
were more protectionist than Germany, we
would place higher barriers on our imports
from Japan than on our imports from
Germany. By contrast, post-war trade agree-
ments generally have been based upon the
non-discriminatory "most-favored-nation"
(MFN) principle. This means thatacountry's
imports ofagiven commodity receive the
, same treatment regardless ofwhere they
comefrom. In applyingtheMFN principlein
traqe negotiations, nations have soughtto
balance their own trade concessions with
those obtained from their partners as a
group; they have, in effect, sought
reciprocity on a multilateral basis.
In contrast, the rationale underlyingbilateral
reciprocity is that the benefits from trade
liberalization should be reciprocal on a
bilateral basis. Realistically, however, the
gains from trade liberalization cannot be
expected to balance bilaterally any more
than one nation'strade balancewith another
can be expected to balance. Because of
differences in industrial structure, country Amay stand to gain mainlyfrom increased
access to B's market, while Bgains primarily
frorl1 increased exports to C, and C from
greater access to A. Only through a multi-
lateral agreement, where A grants conces-
sions mainly usefulto Bwhile benefitting
mainly from C's concessions, are the poten-
tial gains likelyto be greatenough to induce
all countries to incur the political and social
costs ofsignificant trade liberalization.
Economic efficiency considerations also
argue for anon-discriminatory (MFN) prin-
ciple in trade policy. For the world as a
whole, the gains from freer trade come in
large part from the shift of production of
each commodity toward the most efficient,
lowest cost, producer-nation. Bilateral reci-
procitycould have aperverseeffectbyshift-
ing production away from lowercost produ-
cers,)fthese producers were deemed more
protectionist than higher cost producers.
Industrial Policy. Industrial policies are
government measures that affect a nation's
trade indirectly by promoting domestic
producers atthe expense offoreign com-
petitors. For example, it has been argued
that the Japanese government's promotion
of research into computer technology is an
industrial policythatcan discourage imports
and promoteexports even though itdoes not
constitute any direct orexplicit barrier to
trade. Consequently, there hiwe been
several proposals to include industrial
policies in trade negotiations (others have
advocated that the u.s. government adopt
its own industrial policy).
Admittedly, a government could, in prin-
ciple, discourage imports (or encourage
exports) ofa given commoditysimply by
structuring domestic tax or other policies to
foster domestic production ofcompeting
goods, or to discourage consumption of
those goods. On this basis, virtually the
entire array ofgovernment measures-tax
structure, anti-trust laws, and science and
regulatory policies-could be considered
industrial policies.
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Still, the very comprehensiveness of trade-
related industrial policies is a major prac-
tical obstacle to their inclusion in actual
negotiations. Government tax and regu la-
tory policies are generally shaped by
domesticconsiderations, such as equityand
efficiency, that are aptto vary among
nations. Governments are probably less
willing to modify such policies-much less
tailor them to conform to policies ofothers
-toenjoythe gainsfrom free trade alone. At
the least, arriving at rules governing policies
with only indirect impacts on trade is
extremelydifficultto achievegiven the wide
variety ofpolicies involved. Anyone, after
all, can play the industrial policygame:
foreigners, for example, could ask if low
U.S. gasoline taxes (compared to those of
other nations) constitute an industrial policy
aimed at discouraging imports ofsmall
European and Japanese cars.
Protection?
Reflection on some "old" history may
supply the best perspective to the new pro-
tectionism. In the early 1930s, the United
States and other industrial nations sharply
raised trade barriers to alleviate unemploy-
ment-but made the world depression
much worse. The post-war GATT effort to
lowertrade barriers fostered the rapid
growth ofworld trade, promoted the devel-
opmentofmany poorer nations, and
brought about a more efficient allocation of
world resources. Policymakers must ponder
whether, in viewofthese history lessons, the
protection seemingly offered certain indus-
tries by the new trade barriers is worth the
threat they pose to these longer-term gains.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 178,816 1,413 2,791 5.1
Loans and Leases1 6 158,892 1,460 3,537 7.3
Commercial and Industrial 47,202 254 1,239 8.7
Real estate 59,682 131 783 4.3
Loans to Individuals 27,803 201 1,152 14.0
Leases 4,994 - 13 - 69 - 4.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,228 - 36 - 279 - 7.2
Other Securities2 7,696 - 11 - 467 - 18.5
Total Deposits 188,075 -1,698 - 2,922 - 4.9
Demand Deposits 45,579 - 966 - 3,658 - 24.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,997 -1,152 - 1,334 - 13.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,958 26 183 4.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 129,538 - 757 553 1.3
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 40,094 - 544 497 4.0
Time Deposits in Amou'nts of
$100,000 or more 37,802 - 240 - 363 - 3.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,015 1,041 - 3,992 - 56.3
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowing via FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
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